

Visualizing our values: using property elicitation to understand the consequences of constraints

Make predictions about people all the time



$$\Pr[\text{repaying loan} \mid X = \text{person}] = 0.9$$



$$\Pr[\text{person repays loan}] = 0.9$$

Prediction



person approved for a loan

Treatment

Treatments reflect some summary statistic of belief

Accept if $\Pr[\text{repaying loan}] > \frac{1}{2}$,
reject otherwise




Treatments reflect some summary statistic of belief

If $\Pr[\text{repaying}] \dots$


In $[0, \frac{1}{2})$, reject

In $[\frac{1}{2}, \frac{3}{4})$, reject with expedited reapplication

Over $\frac{3}{4}$, accept



Design loss functions to elicit such statistics




Set of outcomes Y	$Y = \{\text{repay, default}\}$
True $p \in \Delta_Y$	$p = \Pr[\text{repay}] = 0.8$
Set of predictions U	$U = [0, 1]$
Set of treatments T	$T = \{\text{award loan, reject loan}\}$

What happens when we think about the population: adding regularizers

When treatments are individual, simply consider each treatment individually

$$\min_{\vec{u}} L(\vec{u}; \vec{p}) := \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^m L(u_i, p_i)$$

Fairness concerns often merit adding regularizers to losses



$$\min_{\vec{u}} L^{\lambda, R}(\vec{u}; \vec{s}; \vec{p}) := (1 - \lambda) \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^m L(u_i, p_i) + \lambda R(\vec{u}; \vec{s}; \vec{p})$$

Now we need to consider population as a whole, and cannot abstract decisions to the individual level

Property elicitation

A loss L elicits a property Γ if, for all $p \in \Delta^m_{\mathcal{Y}}$,

$$\Gamma(\vec{p}) = \arg \min_{\vec{u}} L(\vec{u}; \vec{p})$$

Since L is additive in u , this decomposes into $\{\Gamma(p_i)\}_i$



Fix s . A regularized loss elicits a regularized property Θ if, for all p in $\Delta^m_{\mathcal{Y}}$,

$$\Theta(\vec{p}) = \arg \min_{\vec{u}} L^{\lambda, R}(\vec{u}; \vec{s}; \vec{p})$$


Level sets of properties

Predictions don't have to be perfect, so long as treatments are correct

$$\Gamma_t = \{\vec{p} \in \Delta_{\mathbf{y}}^m : t \in \Gamma(\vec{p})\}$$







Example visualization: 2 agents, binary classification



When do regularizers change the original property?


Theorem (informal): Fix $\lambda \in (0,1)$. Let L elicit Γ , $L^{R,\lambda}$ elicit Θ , and R (which is nonconstant) elicit H . Then $\Gamma = \Theta$ if and only if $H = \Gamma$.

Proof by picture: Counterexample with Demographic Parity




Corollary: common group fairness metrics change it up


- Most group fairness regularizers change the property
 - They are not additive, so regardless of Γ
- Notable exception: calibration
 - Implies changes imposed by calibration constraints are a result of expressiveness of the model




Demographic Parity



False Positive Rates








Equalized Odds





False Negative Rates ¹²

How decisions change as we go through distribution space



Fairness violations when regularized




In summary, come chat!

- Use high-dimensional property elicitation to study the impacts of different regularizers
 - Examples: group fairness constraints
- Can be used to explain performance gaps and translation across different fairness regularizers

Interested in collaborating, questions?

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


CRCS Center for Research on
Computation and Society


at Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences




Experimental results




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False Positive Rates




Equalized Odds



False Negative Rates

Treatments reflect some summary statistic of belief



Given applicants A-F, give loans to the two with the highest probability of repayment

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reject otherwise

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